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Bush Requests a $1.4 Billion Security Package for Mexico
Is the Anti-narcotics “Merida Initiative” Just the Tip of the Iceberg?
Dear
Witness for Peace Supporters,
We have our eye on an important U.S. policy development in Mexico. The Bush
administration has asked Congress to fund $1.4 billion over the next 2 to 3
years for Mexico’s military and police efforts against drug cartels and
narco-trafficking. The “Merida Initiative” went public as part of the
president’s $46 billion supplemental war spending request which was
submitted to Congress on October 22. The Bush Administration earmarked $500
million for Mexico in FY2008 (and $50 million for similar programs in
Central America). Congress will likely vote on the funding proposal in early
2008.
If approved, the FY 2008 Mexico funding will include $306 million for
counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and border security; $56.1 million for
public security and law enforcement; and about $100 million for revamping
the operations of the Mexican Attorney General’s office. Over half of the
money requested will be for the purchase of transport helicopters and
hi-tech scanning equipment for customs and federal police. Nearly $90
million is designated for a number of programs aimed at updating and
digitalizing migration records, national intelligence databases, and court
and prosecution information in the office of the Attorney General.
The funding would constitute a tenfold increase in current U.S.
anti-narcotics aid to Mexico.
However, only $15.1 million—a mere 3%—has been requested for drug demand
reduction activities, which are an essential—if not the only proven—means
for successfully curbing illegal drug production and consumption. Although
North-American consumption keeps the drug trade going, there has been no
announcement from the Bush Administration of any complementary plan for
reduction of domestic demand in the U.S.
But the imbalance between military-led strategies and
civil-society-sponsored demand reduction programs is not the only concern.
The Context
The proposed $1.4 billion Merida Initiative is no isolated proposal, nor is
it the whole story on funding for Mexico’s new drug war. Apparently, the
plan was first discussed in March when President Bush and Mexican President
Felipe Calderon held a closed-door meeting in Merida, Mexico, as part of
their ongoing, but rarely noted, efforts to increase security cooperation
between the two countries. According to the administration of President
Calderon, Mexico plans to put up the majority of the funding: a whopping $7
billion, making the Merida Initiative an $8.4 billion program.
While we have some idea of how U.S. funds will be allocated, would Congress’s approval legitimize a bilateral policy in which there is not yet a clear idea of how the majority of the money will be spent? Is the Merida Initiative a U.S.-borne program for which Mexico foots the majority of the bill and the public responsibility? If so, then the U.S., while having a strong, if not the strongest, voice in the direction of the project, conveniently will have little accountability if funds are misused or if police and military use excessive force against the civilian population. That’s not to say that the U.S. should be telling Mexico how to spend its money, but to question a deliberate blind eye on the part of the U.S. government and our support for federal forces whose recent track record indicates a strong possibility of continuing impunity with respect to human rights violations in Mexico.
Over the
past year, Mexican soldiers have committed serious offenses during
anti-narcotics operations mandated by President Calderon, most notably in
Las Guacamayas and San Jeronimo, small towns in Michoacan, where soldiers
beat, tortured, and sexually abused villagers who merely share the same last
name as a wanted drug-trafficker. In the Apatzingan municipality in the same
state soldiers detained 8 people, including a minor, and then subjected them
to cruel and degrading treatment for 15 hours. Soldiers also arbitrarily
entered private residences without court orders and robbed citizens of their
private property.
Worrisome patterns go beyond drug-specific operations to the handling of
other federal police and military incidents and operations during the past
year and a half. Earlier this year, a group of 20 soldiers opened fire on a
passing vehicle in Sinaloa, killing 5 people including a young child; 7 of
the soldiers later tested positive for marijuana and 1 tested positive for
cocaine. In another recent case, strong evidence demonstrates an upper-level
cover-up of the rape (and consequent death) of a poor indigenous woman by
soldiers in Veracruz. Not to mention the impunity of federal police and
military forces with respect to violent and deadly crackdowns on popular
movements in Atenco, Mexico State, in May 2006 and the city of Oaxaca in
fall 2006 and summer 2007.
The Bigger Security Agenda
When the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held hearings on the Merida
Initiative on October 25, Eliot L. Engel, chair of the Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere commented, “Congress was in no way consulted as this
counter-narcotics package was developed. This is not a good way to kick off
such an important bilateral effort to combat drug trafficking and
drug-related violence in Mexico.” While it is true that the Administration
kept the plan secret since March, Congress should have woken up to the
behind-the-scenes negotiating of U.S.-Mexico security relations over 2 years
ago.
It was then, in March 2005, that the U.S., Canadian, and Mexican heads of
state announced the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP),
an initiative which has no congressional oversight and whose proceedings are
kept out of the public eye. Composed of hand-picked CEOs of major
corporations, including major defense contractors, and officials from the
Departments of Commerce, State, and Homeland Security—and their respective
international counterparts—this trilateral collaboration (according to the
official website
www.spp.gov) “includes ambitious security and prosperity programs to
keep our borders closed to terrorism yet open to trade...The SPP builds
upon, but is separate from, our long-standing trade and economic
relationships.” That is, “it builds upon” NAFTA and seeks to go a
significant step beyond.
The framework of the SPP is clearly stated: “This trilateral initiative is
premised on our security and our economic prosperity being mutually
reinforcing.”
Taking into consideration that anti-narcotics measures are an explicit and
integral component of the SPP collaboration, it is unmistakably clear where
the Merida Initiative comes from.
But whose security and prosperity are we talking about? And whom does the
Merida Initiative really serve if it’s just the tip of the iceberg in an
ocean of secretive policy-making on regional security and deeper integration
of NAFTA?
As our partners on the ground in Mexico see it—and as accumulating evidence
reinforces—the SPP is a strategy already well at work, with the goal of
internationally harmonizing military and police command structures,
intelligence information, and other informational databases among the three
NAFTA countries. The purpose of establishing an integrated North American
security zone is to promote the interests of transnational companies,
privatize and increase extraction of natural resources—most notably Mexican
oil—, create a large continental security buffer for the U.S., and control
political opposition in the name of counter-terrorism.
In March, for instance, it was revealed that the U.S. State Department had
already sponsored a $3 million wiretapping program in Mexico, justified by
counter-terrorism and anti-narcotics efforts. Also, a bilateral program for
sharing travelers’ records and biometric information taken at points of
entry has already been piloted, if not yet fully integrated.
Furthermore, in the face of increasing energy scarcity and unbridled growth
in worldwide demand for oil, the SPP recommends a breakup of Mexico’s
state-owned petroleum company (PEMEX) in order to allow private investment
in natural gas production; it also emphasizes the need for privatization of
investment in non-extraction sectors (such as refining), a stance which
President Calderon has advocated publicly. The SPP also recommends increased
cross-border energy commercialization; and already, measures are in place
for protection of energy infrastructure such as pipelines and power line
connections, with 10 of the latter currently supplying Mexican electricity
to energy-hungry U.S. businesses and private consumers.
Moreover, many civil society organizations are deeply concerned that the SPP
and the Merida Initiative in particular will put U.S. boots on the ground in
Mexico, a notion that both the U.S. and Mexican governments deny. However,
according to the U.S. Congressional Report on Overseas Military Training, in
2006 for the first time U.S. military personnel set foot in Mexico to
provide instruction for Mexican soldiers on intelligence analysis,
counter-terrorist port security, legal aspects of counter-terrorism, and the
piloting of helicopters. In the meantime, Mexican officers continue to
receive extensive counter-terrorism training at U.S. installations such as
Ft. Lackland (TX), Ft. Huachuca (AZ)—center of U.S. Army intelligence—,
Hurlburt Field (FL)—center for Air Force special operations—, and Ft. Bragg
(NC)—where during the nineties members of what would become a prominent
narco-trafficking group in Mexico, Las Zetas, received military
training.
Is Rep.
Engel’s observation that Congress “was in no way consulted” on the Merida
Initiative indicative of an SPP blindfold? What other apparently independent
funding requests are being submitted to Congress with no obvious connection
to the Bush Administration’s comprehensive—and alarmingly furtive—North
American trade and security strategy?
The U.S. security agenda in Mexico goes well beyond the Merida Initiative,
and the underlying reasons for its proposal are worrisome on the levels of
human rights, violations of civil liberties, unregulated private interest,
concerns over energy scarcity, and transparency of government. If all
Congress and the public considers is the narrowness of its counter-narcotics
strategy, the main bulk of the security agenda iceberg will remain, as they
say in Mexico, bajo el agua.
What You Can Do
While the SPP is not subject to congressional review (by its very design)
and is difficult to influence, the Merida Initiative nevertheless presents a
concrete opportunity for action on legislation. As more information becomes
available we will keep you updated and ask you to contact your members of
Congress to express concerns. Please keep posted for future Witness for
Peace action alerts that we will send out prior to the congressional vote.
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